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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts have adequately been set forth in the Brief 
of Appellants and in the responding Brief of William E. 
Pitcher, Jr. and therefore additional discussion of facts 
in this general section is unnecessary. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
ASSESS THE PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AS TO 
THEIR MARKET VALUE AT THE TIME THE 
PARTNERSHIP WAS DISSOLVED. 
Case No. 20949 
(Category No. 13) 
Respondent argues in his brief that it was Plaintiffs1 
burden to prove the value of the assets and that therefore 
the lower court was correct in determining that the equipment 
had no value based solely upon the testimony of Defendants. 
(Respondents1 Brief, pp. 8-9). This argument is deficient for 
several reasons. 
First, Plaintiff in his lawsuit was not attempting to 
obtain a division of partnership assets since he contended 
throughout the trial that no partnership existed. His position 
was that Mr. Pitcher was an employee of Plaintiff and therefore 
all of the equipment and supplies belonged to the plaintiff. 
•Under this theory of the case, therefore, it was unnecessary 
for Plaintiff to prove any value of the assets since he believed 
he was entitled to their complete return. 
Second, since the lower court found that a partnership 
agreement existed and since it was therefore incumbent upon the 
court to divide the partnership assets the lower court could 
only do so if there were competent evidence showing the value 
of such property. An examination of the transcript, however, 
shows that neither party attempted to place a present value on 
the equipment at the time the partnership was dissolved. 
Respondent cites a transcript reference in which he was asked 
by his attorney what the basis for the equipment was at the 
time of termination. The following dialogue between Mr. 
Pitcher and his attorney concerns the tax basis of the equipment 
not its value. 
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Q. Your contract says that the purchase price 
would be determined on the basis of cost of 
equipment less depreciation plus inventory. 
Are you familiar with that clause? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On December 31, 1978 what was the basis of 
the equipment less depreciation? 
A. I would imagine from the figures that I have 
come up with that it was somewhere around 
$6,500 or $7,000. 
Q. Does that include deductions for depreciation? 
A. There's depreciation deducted. The equipment 
was—by that time, six years, was all depreciated 
out. 
Q. So if the contract says you take the cost of 
equipment less depreciation what would this 
figure be? 
A. Well, less depreciation cost of the equipment 
would be zero. 
Q. All would be depreciated straight line by that 
time? 
A. All be depreciated. (Tr. pp. 189-190) . 
Mr. Pitcher did not state that the equipment had no value. 
Rather, he stated that the equipment had been depreciated in 
terms of its taxable basis. The two are obviously quite 
different. As noted in the earlier brief of Appellants, 
had Mr. Pitcher sought specific performance of clause 8 of 
the agreement then the depreciated cost of the equipment would 
be the correct figure to utilize. However, Mr. Pitcher chose 
to terminate whatever agreement existed and to unilaterally 
begin his own company. (Tr. pp. 188-191). It is therefore, 
immaterial what the depreciated value of the equipment was at 
the time of termination and the only material inquiry concerned 
its market value. 
Mr. Pitcher himself acknowledged that the original 
equipment cost around $1,200 and that an additional $7,000 
worth of equipment was purchased throughout the term of the 
agreement. (Tr. pp. 20,32-34). Mr. Sather, on the other 
hand, claimed that $6,500 worth of equipment existed when 
the relationship began and did not know how much additional 
equipment had been purchased during the pendency of the 
agreement. (Tr. pp. 146). 
It also should be noted that under the terms of the 
agreement it is stated that upon termination, "it is agreed 
that an accounting in full shall be had between the parties 
within three days after such termination." (Paragraph 11 of 
Agreement). Mr. Pitcher failed to provide any sort of 
accounting to the plaintiff as to all of the equipment and 
inventory which he took and made a part of his own business. 
Furthermore, since this equipment was in the possession of 
Mr. Pitcher after the litigation began and since only Mr. 
Pitcher would know what equipment came from the previous 
agreement and what equipment was -purchased subsequently it 
would be placing an unfair burden upon the plaintiff to 
establish the market value of the equipment now maintained 
in Defendant's company. 
In any event, this is a case of equity and it will require 
little effort for the lower court to determine the value, if 
any, of the equipment which was taken from the partnership 
business by Mr. Pitcher. Further, this Court should instruct 
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the lower court not to consider the amount of depreciation 
taken on this equipment since it is entirely irrelevant to 
a partnership accounting. 
For this reason, therefore, the matter should be remanded 
to the lower court for further proceedings. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MATHEMATICAL 
COMPUTATION OF PLAINTIFF'S OBLIGATION 
FOR THE ALLEGED LOSS SUSTAINED BY THE 
BUSINESS. 
Plaintiff in his opening Brief raised a number of problems 
as to the award by the lower court of $6,000 to Defendant for 
reimbursement of alleged losses suffered in the business. 
These problems include: 
1. -An erroneous mathematical figure which is not based 
upon the evidence; 
2. The error in the lower court's consideration of 
Plaintiff's tax benefit; 
3. The lack of any evidence to show that these losses 
were ever paid to creditors; and 
4. The failure of the lower court to order the assets of 
the partnership sold before the individual partners were assessed 
losses. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 16-18). 
Defendant in his Brief responds only to the first problem 
area. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 11-12). Defendant argues that 
the evidence showed that if anything Plaintiff owed a larger 
sum of money to Defendant. Again, however, plaintiff Sather 
would dispute these calculations. First, it appeared from the 
evidence that the $9,888 loss included $4,946 of unpaid taxes. 
Admittedly, the record is unclear as to this point but the 
defendant's own testimony would seem to support this contention. 
In a dialogue with his attorney Defendant stated: 
Q. According to your records the term of the 
partnership shows approximately a total loss 
of $9,800. Would that be correct? 
A. I believe. I didn't figure it up, but I believe 
that would be about correct. 
Q. Did he share in any of that loss with you? 
A. No. 
Q. How did you cover that loss? 
A. Well, we just didn't pay a few bills for a while. 
We got a little money and then we would pay the 
bills. In fact, part of it was Internal Revenue 
money that was taken to pay bills with, and it was 
supposed to go to the Internal Revenue. (Tr. p. 56). 
The $446.17 paid to the State for back taxes, again, out 
of Defendant's own mouth, was paid from the business account 
and therefore Defendant cannot receive a credit for this payment. 
(Tr. p. 183). Thus, the original calculation made by Appellant 
in his opening Brief are correct and at the most he should be 
liable for $2,900 to the defendant for any business losses. 
Defendant failed in his Brief to show any evidence where 
these business losses had in fact been paid. Respondents state, 
"Mr. Pitcher had paid the entire operating loss" but the record 
citation given only refers to the payment of State and Federal 
taxes. Before Defendant can make a claim for reimbursement of 
operating losses he must prove that he actually paid such losses 
since otherwise Plaintiff could pay the same debts twice. 
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Next, Defendant states that the interest owed to him is 
well over $2,700 and therefore he should not complain about 
the judgment. Again, there is no specific finding as to what 
interest the court is referring to or what amount such interest 
is based upon. Respondent fails to address the counter-considera-
tion of the lower court in penalizing Plaintiff for the tax 
deduction he claimed from the business loss. Basically, the 
entire finding is so general and vague that it amounts to 
nothing but an estimate of what the court believes should be 
owing from the business operation. In a court of equity, however, 
Plaintiff is entitled to an exact accounting which should clarify 
in detail the amounts being debited against Plaintiff's account. 
Finally, Respondent completely failed to address the argument 
that before any personal judgments can be levied against one 
partner in favor of another that the partnership assets must 
be liquidated. To allow Mr. Pitcher to unilaterally take all 
of the partnership equipment and inventory, to place a zero 
value upon the equipment, to claim business losses for which no 
proof of payment was ever made, and then to require Plaintiff to 
be personally liable to Defendant for this alleged loss is 
certainly against all of the traditional principles of partner-
ship liquidation. 
For these reasons, therefore, the case should also be 
remanded for additional accounting clarification. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN COMPUTING THE 
ALLEGED AMOUNT OWING BY PLAINTIFF TO 
DEFENDANT FOR RENTAL OF DEFENDANT'S 
BUILDING AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, LACHES 
PRECLUDED DEFENDANT FROM RAISING ANY 
CLAIM AS TO THE RENTAL OF THE BUILDING 
OR THE BASE RADIO STATIONS. 
Appellant argued in his opening Brief that the lower court 
incorrectly calculated the amount of rental on Defendant's 
building for a one-year period. (Appellant's Brief, p. 18-19). 
Respondent contends that while this argument is correctly 
based upon Defendant's own statement that such was either a 
misstatement or an error in transcription. (Respondent's Brief, 
p. 10) . 
Again, it is unclear from the record which date should 
apply in this case. Since Mr. Pitcher was both an employee of 
Mr. Sather and an alleged partner the time period referred to 
in the testimony cited by Respondent is also ambiguous as to 
when the time period began. Upon remand, it should be a simple 
task by using documentary evidence to show the correct period 
of time in which Defendant's building (not Plaintiff's building 
as is erroneously stated in Respondent's Brief, p. 10) was 
utilized by the partnership. 
The question of the rental of the radio equipment was 
not addressed by Respondent. Certainly, Plaintiff was entitled 
to know at least from the time when Defendant decided to terminate 
the partnership that he was being charged for the equipment 
which had previously been used in his business operation. 
Finally, Respondent has not refuted Plaintiff's claim that 
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the doctrine of laches is applicable to this case. Certainly, 
no surprises were presented to either counsel or party in this 
case. Both sides contended that the others failed to act in a 
reasonable manner during this time period as to one aspect of 
the case or the other. 
It is inequitable to allow a claim for rental of Defendant's 
building to be made against Plaintiff when no discussion concerning 
the amount of rent or that any claim would ever be made had ever 
occurred between the parties prior to the lawsuit. Equally 
inequitable is the imposition of rental fees for radio equipment 
*when no notice was given that such equipment would be charged at 
a normal rental rate. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the various ambiguities and errors made by the 
lower court in its Findings and Judgment it is only equitable 
and just that this matter be remanded for a full hearing so 
that an accounting of partnership assets and liabilities may be 
made. It is difficult at this point in time because of the 
unclear record to know what the final outcome of such an accounting 
would be between the two parties. However, regardless of the 
outcome, Plaintiff is entitled to have a court equitably divide 
the business assets and liabilities even though Plaintiff contests 
that such a business relationship ever existed. 
It is for these reasons, therefore, that the Judgment of 
lower court should be reversed and that the case should be 
remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 29th day of July, 1986. 
(9MXA& hJJ 
C r a i g Eg JCook 
Attorney for Appellants 
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